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Declaratory Judgments in Indiana, by Edwin Borchard. Indiana Law
Journal. Volume XIX. April, 1944. Number 3.
This article, which treats of the historical development of the decla-
ratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act in Indiana since
its adoption in 1927, is of particular interest to Indiana lawyers. The
author cites Brindley vs. Meara, 209 Ind. 144, -98 N. E. 301 (1935) as
being typical of a long line of Indiana decisions evincing the Indiana
Supreme Court's "unfortunate" hostility to the Declaratory Judgment
Act. The ruling in the Brindley case, supra, was that if in a particular
case any other remedy is available, a declaratory action should be dis-
missed as inappropriate. The effect of the foregoing and subsequent de-
cisions is, the author asserts, "practically repealing the Declaratory
Jlidgment Act."
The various types of grievance susceptible of declaratory relief are
discussed in the article, including its relation to public law. Under Sec-
tion 2 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, any person interested
under a written instrument, including a statute or municipal ordinance,
may have determined any question of construction or validity arising
under the instrument and obtain a declaration of rights thereunder.
Despite the Court's inclination to construe narrowly the Act in this re-
spect, the author cites several Indiana cases wherein businessmen have
availed themselves of declaratory judgments in challenging the constitu-
tionality, construction or applicability of a statute or ordinance. For in-
stance, in Division of Labor of Dept. of Commerce and Indus-
tries vs. Indianapolis News Publishing Co., 109 Ind. App. 88, 32 N. E.
(2nd) 722 (1941) a publishing company sued the Division, an ad-
ministrative body, for a declaration plus injunction, that a 1929 statute
prohibiting minors from working in gainful occupations did not
apply to its newsboys. A declaration on the merits in the plaintiff's
favor, together with injunctive relief, was allowed, which was surprising
in lieu of the general tenor of the Indiana decisions.
The author further stresses the value of declaratory judgments as
"civil adjudications of penal laws." The remedy is said to be particu-
lary appropriate now in guiding businessmen dealing with the multi-
tude of so-called "police power regulations," state and local, carrying
penalties for their infraction. Thus where a declaration of rights is had
before the "seeds of the controversy ripen," the jeopardized businessman
is not subjected to a criminal trial in order to establish the validity, con-
struction, or applicability of a law, the meaning of which is doubtful to
both the businessman and enforcing officials. Illustrative of this sort of
thing is Dept. of State vs. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co.,--Ind.-, 46 N.E.
(2nd) 237 (1943). There the State Board of Pharmacy was threatening
criminal prosecution against the Kroger Co. for selling vitamin capsules
allegedly in violation of a regulation made in pursuance of a statute
providing that "prescriptions" must be sold only in drug stores. Kro-
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ger's contention was, that, the disputed article was an "accessory food"
and hence not subject to the sales limitations prescribed by the Board,
further contending that the regulation in question was void. The trial
court rendered a declaratory judgment. However, when the case was
appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court, a dismissal of the action wak
ordered for want of jurisdiction on the ground that a "criminal prose-
cution" was the appropriate action. Thus, the author contends, the spirit
of the Act .has been frustrated in Indiana.
The author concludes by saying: "A re-examination of the subject in
the light of history and modern practice which would overrule B'indley
vs. Mear* and its stultifying effects, are indispensable to an efficient ad-
ministration of justice." -David S. Landis.
Estate PZanning, by Milton Elrod, Jr. Vol. 19, Indiana Law Journal-
April, 1944, Number 3.
Estate planning concerns itself in a very large part with estate tax
problems. Today federal estate tax liabilities are three and four times
as great as those faced in estates of comparable size barely ten years
ago. A good example, an estate after deductions, but before exemptions
totaled a $100,000 net estate and paid a federal estate tax of $1,500.
Today the tax on that estate is $4800.00. These increases in tax liabili-
ties have resulted in part from substantial increases in the federal
estate tax rates, of course, and in part from a reduction, a continuing
reduction, in the federal estate tax redemption. The present tax exemp-
tion of $60,000 may seem at first, quite sufficient however even though
this is true if one thinks in terms of the estate which will be subject
to promote, which of course, is the estate with which we as lawyers
are commonly concerned yet it is a fact that many types of property
which are not part of the estate for probate purposes are part of the
estate for federal estate tax purposes. Examples, property held in joint
title with another person with the right of survivorship, property held
in tenancy by the entirety by the husband and wife. Another example
of property held which is ordinarily not considered part of the estate
but is still taxable, is life insurande payable to named beneficiaries.
Under Annuity Refunds Benefits, War Risk Insurance, Baby Bonds,
Defense bonds are all part of the estate for federal estate taxing pur-
poses. When we consider all of the property that must be considered for
tax purposes, and when we think in terms of present day tax liabilities
and exemptions and rates, we are very likely to find a surprising num-
ber of our clients in a taxable estate bracket.
There is a very real and a veiy acute problem faced by a very great
number of men today. Estate planning has become an essential part of
every estate. The first step your client can take in the way of sound
estate planning and estate conservation, is to check once again in the
light of today's tax and today's tax philosophies the cash demands that
must be met in event of death. For times change and tax laws change;
and as a result estate needs for cash change radically. A provision for
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
adequate funds to meet potential estate liabilities must be included in
your clients estate planning. Upon the doing of this a step forward to-
ward a sound estate plan has been taken. A real problem does exist,
it would be profitable for lawyers to check this question further.
-Theodore M. Ryan.
Rylands v. Fletcher in Illinois, by Edmund W. Burke. Chicago Kent Law
Review. Volume 22. March Issue, 1944.
Rylands v. Fletcher gave birth to the principles that an owner of
land assumes absolute liability to others by bringing upon his land some-
thing that is inherently dangerous, or by participating in some activity
upon his premises which is of an extrahazardous nature and likely to
cause mischief if it escapes.
The author states that the late Professor Bohien has championed on
the theory that a person who engages in a hazardous enterprise, even
though it be of economic value, should pay any damage inflicted as a
consequence of the hazard inherent in the enterprise.
Under the disguise of a nuisance the principle has received far
greater recognition than has been admitted in the United States. The
author comes to the conclusion that the rule has been accepted by Illinois
courts and cites various cases to prove his point.
In the case of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Heiner-
burg the court stated: "that a person, who for his own purposes, brings
on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief
if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, he is
prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural conse-
quence of its escape." Justice icAllister also cited Rylands v. Fletcher.
In conclusion Mr. Burke made the point clear that he was not un-
sympathetic with the early authorities who criticized the doctrine, but
brought out the point that they lived at a time when this country had
not reached its present state of economic and commercial development.
There was reason then for .encouraging industry, even if this encourage-
ment took the form of providing immunity to the pioneers thereof from
harms caused to others in the absence of willful or negligent fault. He
then states that this period of American History is past and there is no
reason now why a person who engages in an enterprise upon his own
premises for his own gain should not pay for harms that he causes to
other premises by reason of that enterprise, whether guilty of fault in
the conduct of that enterprise or not.
-William J. O'Connell.
